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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the law of bank cheques and focuses on the recent Court of 
Appeal decision in Yan v Post Office Bank Limited [1994] I NZLR 154, the leading 
authority on bank cheques in this country. 
The writer concludes that, through custom and banking practice, bank cheques have 
acquired a peculiar and unique status as a banking instrument that is said to be the 
equivalent of cash. The writer examines the Bills of Exchange Act that has 
traditionally regulated banking instruments and concludes that the provisions of the 
Act are not truly applicable to the bank cheque. 
It is argued that the case is sufficient that a new legal framework needs to be 
provided to regulate bank cheques. Any such framework will need to recognise the 
bank cheque's peculiar characteristics. Only then will the bank cheque achieve, with 
the appropriate certainty, its unique status as a guarantee of payment. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, and bibliography) comprises 
approximately 14,000 words). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1 
2 
"A [bank cheque] circulates in the commercial world as the equivalent of 
cash ... People accept a [bank cheque] as a substitute for cash because 
the bank stands behind it, .. . "1 
In modern economies, there are, rn general terms, two kinds of cheques
2 in 
daily use. The first kind is the ordinary personal cheque, a cheque which is 
drawn on a bank by the bank's customer. The second kind is the bank cheque, 
a cheque which is drawn by a bank on itself. 
Both kinds of cheques have developed as banking instruments to transfer funds. 
They have the essential advantage over cash in that they are less subject to 
the risk of theft or other loss. However, the ordinary personal cheque is 
subject to its own risks which prevent it from being the complete cash 
substitute. First, there is the risk that the drawer of a personal cheque may 
have insufficient funds to meet the cheque. Therefore the bank, as it is qu ite 
entitled to do, will refuse to make payment. Second, there is the risk that the 
drawer of a personal cheque may, for whatever reason, countermand his or her 
instruction to the bank and stop payment on the cheque. 
Despite these risks, along with their resultant costs, personal cheques are 
widely used in everyday business. Most businesses will accept payment by wa y 
of a personal cheque, although now often following appropriate identification 
and / or credit verification. The costs of having payment not honoured have to 
be built in as a cost to the business. 
National Newark Essex Bank v Giordano 268 A.2d 327 at 329 (1970). The 
words "bank cheque" have been substituted for "cashier's check", the 
American equivalent to a bank cheque. See p.50 of this paper for 
further analysis. 
At this stage references to "cheques" are in the generic sense as 
commonly understood. An analysis of whether in fact bank cheques are 
cheques at all follows. In addition, there are, of course, traveller's 
cheques which are not the subject of this paper. 
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However, there are some transactions where a seller will not be prepared to 
accept any risk. The transaction may be too important or too valuable to the 
seller to accept a personal cheque. But, on the other hand, the seller, and 
indeed the buyer, may not be prepared to run the obvious risks involved in 
using cash. 
More recently, credit cards and electronic funds transfer systems have become, 
in some circumstances, an available compromise. Credit card companies will, for 
a fee, assume some of the risks involved in a credit card transaction. 
Electronic funds transfer systems, by an immediate debit and credit of the 
respective parties' bank accounts, have the potential to remove the risks 
involved in the more traditional methods of payment. However, until such time 
as these newer systems become universally available, it is the bank cheque that 
business people look to provide certainty of payment. 
Bank cheques are ideally suited to minimise the risks inherent in the use of 
cash or personal cheques. Bank cheques are not as susceptible to theft or 
other loss as cash3. The risk that the bank may not have sufficient funds to 
meet a bank cheque, i.e. the risk of the bank's solvency, "can be discarded as a 
realistic possibility."4 And the risk that the buyer may stop payment of a 
bank cheque is also minimised. This is because a bank cheque is not the 
buyer's cheque to stop. A bank cheque is a cheque which is drawn by a bank 
on itself. 5 
The use of bank cheques has now become commonplace in the settlement of 
important commercial transactions. Indeed, often payment by way of bank 
cheque is a condition of settlement. Undoubtedly, the business community's 
perception of bank cheques is that they are a guarantee of payment. Certainly, 
Cash being easier to disperse and therefore less traceable. 
Casey J in Williams v Gibbons [1994] l NZLR 273 at 276. See p.31 of 
this paper for further analysis. 
While there is no New Zealand authority on point, it is suggested that it 
can be safely stated that the bank's customer, the remitter, has no right 
to order a bank to stop payment on a bank cheque. The point is 
considered further in the context of American authorities at p.52 of this 
paper. 
3 
that was the perception of a Mr Ricky Yan who was the payee of a bank 
cheque drawn by Post Office Bank Limited (Post Bank"): 
II I thought a bank cheque made out to me was, namely the nearest 
equivalent to cash that could be obtained being dependant only on the 
strength of the bank."6 
However, to Mr Yan's surprise, Post Bank would not honour the bank cheque in 
question on presentation. The resultant court case was the first time the New 
Zealand courts have had to consider the question of whether, and if so when, a 
bank may dishonour a bank cheque. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal decision 
in Yan v Post Office Bank Ltd 7 is the leading authority on bank cheques in 
this country. 
This paper examines the law of bank cheques, such that it is, and will focus on 
the Court of Appeal's decision in Yan. However, first, it is necessary to 
consider, just what is a bank cheque? 
II. THE HISTORY AND BANKING PRACTICE OF BANK CHEQUES 
A. History 
6 
1 
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"The term "bank cheque" is a technical expression that has gained a 
popular meaning by the practice of Australian [and New Zealand] banks 
over a long period of time, the practice having commenced about the 
1890s. The term is peculiar to Australia [and New Zealand]. In the 
United States they arc called "cashiers' cheques" and in the United 
Kingdom and Canada the equivalent is the "bank draft".
118 
Yan v Post Office Bank Ltd (Unreported) High Court (Wellington 
Registry) CP 114/ 92 Master Williams Q.C. at 4. 
[1994] 1 NZLR 154 
W S Weerasooria "The Australian Bank Cheque - Some Legal Aspects" 
(1976) 2 Monash L. Rev. 180 at 181 
9 
10 
11 
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Just how the banking practice of issuing bank cheques (or their equivalent) 
commenced is not entirely clear. However, it appears that the bank cheque 
gradually took over the place of the "marked" or "certified" cheque. 
"[With a marked or certified cheque), the bank on which the cheque is 
drawn certifies that the drawer's account is sufficiently in funds to 
provide for payment of the cheque. This is affected by writing "marked 
good for payment" or "certified good" across one corner of the 
customers cheque and adding the bank's official stamp initialled by the 
teller."9 
The legal effect of such a marking was: 
" ... to give the cheque additional currency by [showing) on the face that 
it is drawn in good faith on funds sufficient to meet its payment, and 
by adding to the credit of the drawer that of the bank on which it is 
drawn.1110 
Today, the banking practice of marking cheques, except by the banks themselves 
for clearance purposes, has largely disappeared. Indeed, in 1920, the Committee 
of London Clearing Bankers resolved: 
That the practice of marking or certifying at the request of a customer 
his cheques or drafts upon a clearing bank be discontinued , and that if 
such a request be made, the banks should issue to their customer rn 
exchange for his cheque either a draft on themselves or on the Bank of 
England."11 
Ibid 
Gaden v The Newfoundland Savings Bank [1899] AC 281 at 285, also 
Imperial Bank of Canada v Bank of Hamilton [l 903] AC 49 at 54 and 
Bank of Baroda Ltd v Punjab National Bank Ltd [1944] AC 176 at 187. 
M Mcgrah & F Ryder Paget's Law of Banking (10th ed) Butterworths 
1989 London at 209 
5 
But the need for a banking instrument with certainty of payment remained. 
The use of bank cheques steadily grew and by 1921 the Privy Council in Union 
Bank of Australia Ltd v McClintock observed: 12 
"It is common in Australia for banks, when requested, to issue to 
customers "bank cheques" in form drawn by themselves on themselves, in 
favour of a named payee or order or bearer." 
Similarly, in New Zealand the use of bank cheques became common and it is 
interesting that the Court of Appeal in Williams v Gibbons 18 commented that 
" ... it is common knowledge that bank cheques have been used (in conveyancing 
transactions] for decades." 14 The American cashier's cheque (or "check") 
appears to have a similarly long history. In Clark v Chicago Title Trust Co15 
the Supreme Court of Illinois referred to the appellant receiving "what is called 
a cashier's check" 16 on 3 April 1897. 
B. Banking Practice 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Bank cheques evolved from the need to have, as a substitute for cash, a 
banking instrument that had certainty of payment. But, the regulation of bank 
cheques has largely been left to the banks themselves. There is no express 
statutory recognition of bank cheques in New Zealand. However, as a matter of 
banking practice, the banks themselves have developed a reasonably consistent 
regime in respect to bank cheques. 
In New Zealand bank cheques take the form of an order to pay a sum of 
money, addressed by a bank to itself. They are made up in books of standard 
forms. Practices vary from bank to bank but as a rule they are signed by two 
(1922] 1 AC 240 at 245 
[1994] 1 NZLR 273. See p.31 of this paper for further analysis. 
Ibid at 275 
57 N.E. 1061 (1990) 
Ibid. See n 130 
17 
18 
19 
6 
officers of the bank from a list designated by the branch manager of the bank 
for that purpose. Bank cheques for small sums (e.g. not exceeding $1,000) may 
be signed by one officer from the list. It is usual that it is the delegated 
responsibility of the officers (or officer) signing the bank cheque to ensure 
that: 
(i) all instructions regarding the application for and the completion of the 
bank cheque have been complied with; and 
(ii) funds are in hand to pay for the bank cheque before it is issued. 
The particulars of the bank cheque (i.e. the date, amount payable and payee's 
name) are typed on the instrument prior to its issuance to the bank's customer. 
Banking manuals direct that a bank cheque must be drawn to an identifiable 
payee.17 Therefore, bank cheques drawn to cash are not permitted. As a 
matter of banking practice, in New Zealand, bank cheques are not drawn 
payable to bearer.18 
Similarly, banking manuals direct that a bank cheque should be crossed and 
marked "not negotiable".19 A charge is made, e.g. $5.00, inclusive of cheque 
duty. Typically, a bank cheque remains current for six years from date of 
issue. Although, if the cheque remains unpresented for a lengthy period of 
time (e.g. more than three months from the date of issue) the bank will make 
Section 3(1) of the Bills of Exchange Act requires that a bill of 
exchange must be payable to or to the order of a specified person. 
There appears to be no statutory impediment in New Zealand as to why 
a bank cheque cannot be drawn payable to bearer. The practice then is 
probably only historical. Much of New Zealand's banking practices are 
derived from the United Kingdom and in the United Kingdom it is 
unlawful to make the English equivalent of a bank cheque payable to 
bearer. See p.43 of this paper. 
There is no statutory requirement that a bank cheque must be crossed 
and marked not negotiable. Presumably the banking practice is to afford 
the issuing bank the protection of s.81 of the Bills of Exchange Act. 
Eg. if the bank's customer obtains the bank cheque by fraud and 
negotiates the cheque to a holder in due course that person will not 
obtain good ti tie. 
7 
enquiries of the customer. Bank cheques are usually collected through the 
bank's general clearing system.20 
III. AN ANALYSIS OF YAN v POST OFFICE BANK LIMITED 
A. The Background Facts 
20 
"The facts as set out in the High Court judgment disclose a series of 
transactions involving members of the Chinese community who appear to 
have been the victims of a Mr Lam, also known as Mr Wong, and 
conveniently ref erred to by counsel and by the Master as "Lam/Wong". 
He is said to have since disappeared leaving behind a large number of 
similar frauds. A number of the Masters findings were not challenged 
on the appeal, and it is sufficient for present purposes to set out only 
that part of the narrative which is relevant to the issues argued on the 
appeal. 
A cheque for $2 million was drawn by Lam/Wong on a bank in Auckland 
and credited to the account of a Mr Wah at a bank in Wellington. It 
was said that Mr Wah believed Lam/Wong was intending to make a 
substantial investment with him, which would involve a number of 
restaurants. Mr Wah then drew a cheque for $250,000 payable to a Mr 
Deng. Mr Deng told Mr Yan that this money had been given to him to 
use as Lam/Wong required for a number of business ventures which were 
to include Mr Yan's and also Mr Deng's acquaintance Mr Chan. Mr 
Deng deposited the cheque in his account with Post Bank. Mr Deng and 
Lam/Wong, identified by photographs taken by the bank's surveillance 
system, then attended other branches of Post Bank to make withdrawals 
from Mr Deng's account. One of these was by way of the bank cheque 
in question. The cheque was for $50,000 payable to "Far East 
International or order". Far East International is the trading name of 
one of Mr Yan's businesses. 
This information is based on advices given to the writer by officers of 
various banks. However, any errors are, of course, the writer's. 
21 
8 
Lam/Wong then gave this bank cheque to Mr Yan, persuading Mr Yan to 
give him $32,000 cash in exchange. Mr Yan says he expected certain 
other dealings to follow, notably the sale of his business to a consortium 
of Hong Kong Chinese whom Lam/Wong claimed to represent. Mr Yan 
thought the difference between the amount of the cheque and the cash 
which he paid was to be an earnest of good faith and ultimately a 
deposit on the sale of his business. He relied on the cheque as being a 
bank cheque and therefore the nearest equivalent to cash, being 
dependent only on the strength of the bank. 
In the meantime the cheque for $2 million drawn by Lam/Wong and 
deposited in Mr Wah's account had been dishonoured. Mr Wah's cheque 
for $250,000 deposited to Mr Dcng's account was then dishonoured in 
turn. This meant that Mr Deng did not have in his account the funds 
on which he had relied to obtain the bank cheque in favour of Far East 
International. 
cheque."21 
Post Bank therefore stopped payment on the bank 
Ignoring the cheques for $2 million and $250,000, the position can be shown 
thus: 
Bank Cheque Bank Cheque Bank Cheque 
Post Bank -------------> Deng -------------> Lam/Wong -------------> Yan 
<-----/ /----- <------------
$50,000 $32,000 
Mr Yan issued summary judgment proceedings against Post Bank for (inter alia) 
wrongful dishonour of the bank cheque. Post Bank defended the claim arguing 
it was entitled to stop payment because: 
(i) it had issued the cheque at the request of a customer for a 
consideration which had wholly failed; 
n7 at 156, 157 
9 
(ii) the person from whom Mr Yan obtained the cheque did not have good 
title to it; 
(iii) Mr Yan did not receive the cheque honestly and in good faith. 
In the High Court, Master Williams Q.C. upheld the first of these grounds and 
dismissed Mr Yan's application for summary judgment. The second and third 
grounds were rejected after the High Court ruled that certain evidence tendered 
by Post Bank was inadmissablc. 22 Mr Yan appealed the High Court's decision 
to the Court of Appeal. 
B. The Nature of the Bank Cheque 
22 
The term "bank cheque" is a misnomer. Despite the everyday usage of the term 
and that such instruments are prominently labelled as such, the Court of Appeal 
agreed with the High Court that a bank cheque is, in fact, not a cheque at all. 
Nor indeed is it a bill of exchange ("bill"). 
This follows from ss3 and 73 of the Bills of Exchange Act 1908 ("NZBEA"). 
Sections 3(1) and 3(2) of the NZBEA provide: 
"3(1) A bill of exchange is an unconditional order in writing, addressed 
by one person to another signed by the person giving it, requiring the 
person to whom it is addressed to pay on demand, or at a fixed or 
determinable future time, a sum certain in money to or to the order of 
a specified person, or to bearer. 
3(2) An instrument that docs not comply with these conditions, or that 
Post Bank sought to adduce evidence that purported to show that 
Mr Yan did not obtain the bank cheque honestly, in good faith, for 
value and with no notice of any defect in title. However, both the High 
Court and the Court of Appeal ruled that the evidence was inadmissible 
on the grounds of hearsay. 
23 
24 
25 
10 
orders any act to be done in addition to the payment of money, is not a 
bill of exchange." 
The underlining is the writer's. 
And, s73(1) of the NZBEA provides: 
"73(1) A cheque is a bill of exchange drawn on a banker payable on 
demand." 
The Court noted that, while a bank cheque follows the form of a cheque, it is 
not an order addressed by one person to another, as is required by s3(1) of the 
NZBEA. Rather, a bank cheque is addressed by a bank to itself. Therefore, 
pursuant to s3(2) of the NZBEA, a bank cheque cannot be a bill of exchange. 
Nor can it be a cheque because, pursuant to s73(1) of the NZBEA, a cheque 
must be a bill of exchange. 23 
The Court also referred to Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd v Mann 24 
where the Privy Council said: 25 
"Bank cheques are similar to "bank drafts" as known in the United 
Kingdom and are commonly used by solicitors in the settlement of 
conveyancing and by other persons engaged in commercial transactions 
where it is inconvenient to use cash but the creditor wishes for some 
further assurance of payment than the debtor's personal cheque. They 
are in legal significance promissory notes made and issued by the bank." 
Promissory notes ("notes") are defined in s84(1) of the NZBEA: 
There is little doubt about this finding. While the Court of Appeal did 
not refer to any authority, it has long been the position in the United 
Kingdom. See Capital and Counties Bank Limited v Gordon [1903] AC 
240 at 251, 252. 
[1961] AC 1 
Ibid at 7 
26 
27 
28 
11 
"84(1) A promissory note is an unconditional promise in writing made by 
one person to another, signed by the maker, engaging to pay on demand, 
or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in money to or 
to the order of a specified person or to bearer." 
One might question how a bank cheque can be a promissory note when the 
instrument contains no actual promise. However, there is old authority that no 
precise words of contract are essential in a promissory note, 26 providing that 
the legal effect of the note is an unconditional promise.27 
While not being a bill of exchange nor a cheque, nevertheless, as a promissory 
note, bank cheques are still subject to certain provisions of the NZBEA. By 
s90, Part I of the NZBEA applies to notes. And by ssl, 5(2)(e) and 6 of the 
Cheques Act 1960, ss76 to 81 in Part II of the NZBEA also apply to notes. 
As the Court explained:28 
"[The Cheques] Act is by sl to be read with and to form part of the 
Bills of Exchange Act. Section 5 provides protection in certain cases to 
a banker collecting payment of a cheque in good faith and without 
negligence. By subs (2)(e), the section is to apply to "Any draft payable 
on demand drawn by a banker upon himself." Section 6 then goes on to 
provide that the provisions of the principal Act relating to crossed 
cheques shall, so far as applicable, have effect in relation to instruments 
other than cheques to which s5 applies. The effect of these provisions 
is that the instrument with which we are concerned, although not within 
the definition of "cheque" in s73, is nevertheless made subject to the 
provisions applying to cheques which follow in ss76 to 81." 
Brooks v Elkins (I 836) 2 M & W 74 
Sibree v Tripp (I 846) 15 M & W 23, Syndic in Bankruptcy of Nasrallah 
Khoury v Khayat [1943] 2 All ER 406. 
n7at 158 
12 
By s90(2) of the NZBEA, the "maker" of a promissory note 1s deemed to 
correspond with the "acceptor" of a bill of exchange. It follows then that, for 
the purposes of Part I of the NZBEA, Post Bank as the maker of the note 
(bank cheque) had the liabilities of an acceptor of a bill. 
Accordingly, the Court distinguished the term "acceptor" in the NZBEA from the 
term "acceptance", as the provisions in the NZBEA relating to "acceptance" do 
not apply to notes by s90(3). This distinction, if correct, provides rather odd 
results. For example, therefore s2l(l) of the NZBEA applies to notes insofar as 
the section refers to "acceptor", but the proviso to the section does not apply 
to notes because it only refers to "acceptance". 
The Court also noted s5(2) of the NZBEA. In particular, that where in a bill 
the drawer and drawee are the same person, as 1s the case in a bank cheque, 
the holder of the bill may treat the instrument, at his or her option, either as 
a bill of exchange or as a promissory note. On the facts of the Yan case, 
there was no evidence that Mr Yan had treated the bank cheque as a bill and 
therefore the Court considered the provisions of the NZBEA dealing with notes. 
Therefore, of particular importance was s85 of the NZBEA: 
"85 A promissory note is incomplete until delivery thereof to the payee 
or bearer." 
Accordingly, the bank cheque was incomplete until handed to Mr Yan by 
Lam/ Wong. The Court found that, in the absence of any other evidence, by 
handing over the bank cheque to Mr Deng, Post Bank had impliedly authorised 
Mr Deng to deliver the cheque to Mr Yan which he did through Lam/ Wong. 
The Court found the fact that delivery was effected through Lam/ Wong was 
immaterial. 
Furthermore, s21(4) of the NZBEA provided that where a bill (or a note by s90) 
is no longer in the possession of the party who has signed it (Post Bank) a 
valid and unconditional delivery is presumed until the contrary is proved . 
Insofar as the evidence that was allowed to be heard, Post Bank were unable to 
prove to the contrary. 
13 
Prima facie, the Court found: 
(i) Post Bank was the maker of a note in favour of Mr Yan
29 and had 
authorised it to be delivered to him; 
(ii) the note was delivered to Mr Yan as the named payee and that delivery 
was presumed to be valid and unconditional (s21(4)); 
(iii) by s90 Post Bank was deemed to be the "acceptor" for the purposes of 
s54 of the NZBEA and had therefore engaged that it would pay the note 
according to its tenor; 
(iv) by s90 Post Bank was deemed to be the "drawer" for the purposes of s55 
of the NZBEA and therefore had engaged in terms of that section that 
the note would on presentation be accepted and paid and that the holder 
would be compensated if it was dishonoured. 
Accordingly, Post Bank was liable unless it could raise some other defence. 
C. Was Mr Yan a Holder in Due Course? 
29 
30 
Prima facie, every holder of a bill (bank cheque) is deemed to be a holder in 
due course.30 And, in terms of s29 of the NZBEA, the Court of Appeal found 
the bank cheque in question: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
was complete and regular on its face; 
was not overdue; 
had not been previously dishonoured; 
The Court had no difficulty that the named payee was "Far East 
International" rather than Mr Yan himself. 
s30(2) NZBEA 
31 
32 
33 
34 
14 
(iv) was obtained by Mr Yan in good faith and for value and with no notice 
of any defect in title.31 
Traditionally a holder in due course enjoys the fullest possible rights over a 
negotiable instrument.32 Therefore, one might have thought that, given the 
Court's findings, Mr Yan should enjoy the fullest possible rights over the bank 
cheque. However, it was not available to Mr Yan to argue he was a holder in 
due course and indeed his counsel in the Court of Appeal did not do so. 
This was because under s29(I)(b) of the NZBEA, a holder in due course is a 
person to whom a bank cheque is negotiated. The bank cheque in the Yan case 
was payable to order (as traditionally New Zealand bank cheques are). 
Accordingly, under s3 l of the NZBEA, such a bank cheque can only be 
negotiated when it is transferred from one person to another in such a manner 
as to constitute the transferee the holder of the cheque, and by the 
indorsement of the holder completed by delivery.
33 In the Yan case, the bank 
cheque was not negotiated to Mr Yan. Neither Mr Deng nor Lam/ Wong could 
as a matter of law negotiate the cheque. This is because, by definition, neither 
could be a "holder"34 of the cheque. Neither Mr Deng nor Lam/Wong were the 
payee or the indorsee of the bank cheque. The bank cheque in question was 
not indorsed by anyone. 
Furthermore, s38 of the NZBEA, which sets out the rights and powers of a 
holder in due course, refers in paragraph (b) to holding the bill free from any 
defect in the title of prior parties. In the Yan case, there were no prior 
parties. 
It could be argued that the part of s29(I)(b) which reads " ... , and that at the 
time the bill was negotiated to him he had no notice of any defect in the title 
Insofar as the admissible evidence showed. See n22. 
J H Farrer & A Borrowdale Butterworths Commercial in New Zealand 
(2nd ed) Butterworths I 992 Wellington at 344 
s31(3) NZBEA 
s2 NZBEA 
35 
36 
15 
of the person who negotiated it" is disjunctive. And, accordingly, the definition 
requires, only if negotiation has occurred, that the transferee had no notice of 
any defect. However, in the writer's view, that is not an ordinary reading of 
the definition and, further, it is noteworthy that s29(1)(a) includes the words 
"if such was the fact" while s29(l)(b) does not. 
In addition, there is House of Lords authority consistent with the Court of 
Appeal's interpretation. The Court referred to the judgment of Cave LC in R E 
Jones Ltd v Waring & Gillow Ltd 35 The facts of this case detail on elaborate 
fraud. A man named Bodenham owed 5,000 pounds to Waring & Gillow Limited 
(Waring). Having no means to pay the debt, Bodenham represented to R E 
Jones Limited (Jones) that he was the agent of a firm of motor car 
manufacturers, who were putting a new car on the market. Bodenham 
persuaded Jones to sign an agreement appointing it as agents for the sale of 
the car on terms that Jones would purchase 500 cars and pay a deposit of 5,000 
pounds. Bodenham told Jones that Waring was financing the motor car 
manufacturers and that the 5,000 pounds should be paid direct to Waring. After 
some discussions regarding the method of payment Jones posted to Waring a 
cheque for 5,000 pounds payable to Waring or order. Waring presented the 
cheque and returned to Bodenham certain goods that Waring had seized under a 
hire purchase agreement. It transpired that no such firm of motor car 
manufacturers existed and when the fraud was discovered Jones sued the 
defendants for the 5,000 pounds as money paid under a mistake of fact. Waring 
argued that it was a holder in due course of the cheque. Cave LC rejected the 
argument and said:36 
"I do not think that the expression "holder in due course" includes the 
original payee of a cheque. It is true that under the definition clause 
of the Act (s2) the word "holder" includes the payee of a bill unless the 
context otherwise requires; but it appears from s29, sub-s.l , that a 
"holder in due course" is a person to whom a bill has been "negotiated", 
and from s3I that a bill is negotiated by being transferred from one 
[ l 926] AC 670. Affirmed rn Hasan v Willson (I 977) l Lloyds Rep. 43 l. 
Ibid at 680. 
37 
38 
39 
40 
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person to another and (if payable to order) by indorsement and delivery. 
In view of these definitions it is difficult to see how the original payee 
of a cheque can be a "holder in due course" within the meaning of the 
Act." 
The Court of Appeal in Yan did note s30(2) of the NZBEA by which every 
holder of a bill is prima facie deemed to be a holder in due course. However, 
the Court found that the considerations set out in the judgment of Cave LC, 
i.e. that by the definition of a holder in due course Mr Yan could not qualify, 
outweighed the prima facie presumption created by s30(2)37 
There is then a certain tension between ss29 and 30(2) of the NZBEA. But, in 
the writer's opinion the Court of Appeal was right to prefer s29. Section 29 
provides an exhaustive definition of "holder in due course", while s30(2), as a 
deeming provision, must be considered in the context of the purpose for which 
it was introduced.38 In the context of s30(2), Yan was not a case where the 
bank cheque was affected with fraud, duress, or force and fear, or illegality39; 
nor was the cheque drawn as a credit contract.40 There was then no shifting 
of the burden of proof for the purposes of s30(2). 
Because of the wording of ss29 and 31 of the NZBEA, the Court of Appeal in 
Yan (and indeed the House of Lords in RE Jones Ltd) had little option but to 
find that the payee of an order cheque is unlikely to qualify as a holder in due 
course. The question therefore arises, is there any good reason for this? In 
the writer's view, the answer must surely be no because, somewhat strangely, 
on the facts of Yan, Mr Yan would have quantified as a holder in due course if 
the bank cheque had been payable to bearer. 
n7 at 161 
JF Burrows Statute Law in New Zealand Butterworths, 1992, Wellington 
at 200 citing Muller v Dalgety & Co Ltd (1909) 9 CLR 693 
s30(2)(a) NZBEA 
s30(2)(b) NZBEA 
41 
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This is because a bank cheque payable to bearer is negotiated by delivery 
alone.41 Accordingly, if Lam/Wong had delivered to Mr Yan such a bank 
cheque, the cheque would have been negotiated. Indeed, on the facts of Yan 
that would have been the third negotiation of a bearer cheque. The first 
negotiation would have been when the bank issued the bank cheque to Mr 
Deng42 . And the second negotiation would have been when Mr Deng delivered 
the cheque to Lam/Wong. It is because a bank cheque payable to bearer is 
negotiated by delivery when it is transferred from one person to another in 
such a manner as to constitute the transferee the holder of the cheque.
43 
"Holder"44 includes the "bearer" of a bank cheque and "bearer"
45 means the 
person in possession of a bank cheque payable to bearer. 
It is difficult to think of any good reason why the rights of a transferee of a 
cheque should differ depending on whether the cheque is made out to order or 
to bearer. In the context of the Australian bank cheque, Edwards thought it 
"faintly ridiculous"46 It is also difficult to think of any good reason why, if 
Mr Yan had indorsed the bank cheque and delivered it to another person, 
thereby negotiating the cheque, that person should be able to qualify as a 
holder in due course47 when Mr Yan could not. 
s31(2) NZBEA 
Delivery is defined in s2 of the NZBEA as meaning "transfer of 
possession, actual or constructive from one person to another." 
Accordingly, it is argued that when the bank officer handed over the 
counter the cheque to Mr Deng, there is delivery (as defined) and 
therefore negotiation (as defined) of a bearer cheque. 
s31(1) NZBEA 
s2 NZBEA 
Ibid 
R Edwards "The Form of Bank Cheques" (1991) 3 Bond L. Rev 174 at 
183 
Providing that person met the criteria of s29 of the NZBEA. 
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There is then a curious lacuna in the NZBEA. Despite meeting all the 
requirements of s29 of the NZBEA, Mr Yan could not qualify as a holder in due 
course. Indeed, even if Mr Deng had indorsed the cheque, thereby purporting 
to negotiate it, Mr Yan still would not have so qualified. This is because Mr 
Deng was not a holder 48 of the cheque and a bank cheque payable to order is 
negotiated by the indorsement of the holder completed by delivery.
49 Of 
course, the position is not confined to bank cheques as the R E Jones Ltd case 
well illustrates. It applies to the payee of all banking instruments that are on 
order paper. 
It is suggested that there is simply no logic to this. It appears to be only the 
consequence of an accident of drafting. A minor amendment to the NZBEA is 
all that would be required to remedy the position. 
D. Did Mr Yan have Good Title? 
48 
49 
50 
51 
One of Post Bank's main arguments in the Yan case was that it was entitled to 
dishonour on the bank cheque pursuant to s8 l of the NZilEA. As discussed 
earlier,50 s81 applies to bank cheques by ssl, 5(2)(e) and 6 of the Cheques Act. 
Section 81 provides that a person who takes a crossed cheque with the 
indorsement "not negotiable" cannot have a better title to the cheque than the 
person from whom he or she took it had. The bank cheque in the Yan case 
was so crossed and marked. Post Bank argued that as neither Mr Deng nor 
Lam/Wong had good title to the cheque, therefore neither could Mr Yan. But 
the Court rejected this argument as:51 
" irrelevant. There was no purported negotiation of the note, and no 
transfer of it from the original payee [Mr Yan)." 
s2 NZBEA 
s31(3) NZBEA 
See n28 
n7 at 164 
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The Court's rejection of this argument has been questioned by De Silva:62 
"What is questionable though is His Honour's finding , that delivery is not 
complete until the cheque is received by the payee. Section 2 of the 
Bills of Exchange Act provides "delivery means transfer of possession, 
actual or constructive, from one person to another". Therefore when 
the customer - who nominates the payee to the bank, because payment 
is owing to the payee from him - obtains the cheque, there is 
"constructive delivery to the payee", and the instrument is complete-
whether it is treated as a bill of exchange, or a promissory note. What 
is more important in dealing with a bank cheque, is the effect of s81 of 
the Bills of Exchange Act. Section 81 simply states that a person who 
takes a crossed cheque with the endorsement "not negotiable", cannot 
have a better title than the person who gave it to him had. The section 
uses the words "the person who takes" and the "person from whom he 
took", and therefore refers to the immediate transferee and transferor 
and not necessarily to the parties to a cheque. In the case of a bank 
cheque, it could be argued, that the customer always remains the 
transferor of the cheque to the payee - whether first having obtained 
the cheque from the bank and then delivering it to the payee, or by 
impliedly appointing the bank as his agent to do so. Bank cheques being 
always endorsed "not negotiable", this would result in the payee's rights 
for payment against the bank always subject to any def enses the bank 
may have against the customer for non-payment (see also the author's 
comment on the High Court decision in [1993] NZLJ 236)." 
De Silva goes on to conclude that the Yan decision could, " greatly undermine 
the importance of s81 of the Act as a protection for drawers."53 This is 
probably correct but the writer doubts that the Court's finding is in fact 
wrong. De Silva's analysis is to emphasise "delivery" at the expense of 
"negotiation" and "title". The purport of s81 is that a crossed cheque bearing 
the words "not negotiable" does not possess the quality of negotiability which 
P. De Silva "The Bank Cheque Resurrected" (1994) NZLJ 84, 85 
Ibid at 85 
54 
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confers upon a holder in due course 54 a good title to payment according to the 
tenor of the cheque and irrespective of defects in the title of the transf eror. 65 
Section 81 certainly uses the words "a person takes" and "person from whom he 
took" which could refer to the immediate transferee and transferor and not 
necessarily to the parties of a cheque. But as a rule the NZBEA does not make 
provision for persons who merely have possession of an order cheque. It would 
seem unlikely that it was intended that s8 I is an exception. The better view, 
in the writer's opinion, is that s8I deals with negotiation and a cheque is 
negotiated when it is transferred from one person to another in such a manner 
as to constitute the transferee the holder of the bill. 56 In the case of an 
order cheque, such as the one in Yan, negotiation requires the indorsement of 
the holder and delivery.57 As the Court said, "there was no purported 
negotiation" 68 of the bank cheque. Therefore s8I is simply irrelevant in the 
circumstances. Further, the Court did not find "that delivery is not complete 
until it is received by the payee"59 as De Silva suggests. Rather the Court 
found that the bank cheque is not complete until it is delivered to the payee60, 
which is not the same thing. 
But the real point is, in the writer's opinion, that, like the definition of a 
holder in due course, s81 is uncertain as to its application to the original payee 
of an instrument payable to order. Again, it is difficult to think of any good 
reason why s81 should be limited in its application to where a bank cheque has 
been negotiated from the original payee or where it has made payable to bearer. 
Again, a small amendment to the NZBEA is all that would be required to make 
the position uniform. 
s29 NZBEA 
s38 NZBEA 
s3I(l) NZBEA 
s3I(3) NZBEA 
n7 at 164 
n52 at 85 
n7 at 159 and 164 
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E. Failure of Consideration 
61 
62 
Another of Post Bank's main arguments was that there had been a total failure 
of consideration between itself and Mr Deng, as Mr Deng had insufficient funds 
to meet the bank cheque. As a question of fact this was undeniable and was 
the primary basis for the High Court's decision in favour of Post Bank. The 
High Court had found that the bank cheque, as with any cheque issued against 
uncleared funds, was subject to dishonour for failure of consideration. The 
Court of Appeal agreed that this was undoubtedly true as between the 
immediate parties to a personal cheque, namely the drawer and payee. And, it 
was also true as between the drawer and a subsequent holder of a cheque (or 
indeed any bill of exchange) where the cheque is marked "not negotiable". This 
is because of the operation of s81 of the NZBEA. "Such a cheque cannot be 
negotiated (s.8) so as to make the holder a holder in due course (s.29) with a 
title free of prior defects (s.38)"61 
But what was not clear was whether Post Bank could rely on failure of 
consideration in the circumstances of a bank cheque, i.e. when Mr Deng was 
not a party to the bank cheque and Mr Yan, with no knowledge of the failure 
of consideration, gave consideration for the cheque in good faith. 
The Court of Appeal accepted that Post Bank as the acceptor of a bill of 
exchange, or as the maker of a promissory note, had the ability to avoid 
liability on the ground of total failure of consideration as a general proposition 
of the common law applicable to contract.62 The Court of Appeal did not 
elaborate on this point. However, it is well accepted in New Zealand that a 
bill of exchange is to be treated as the equivalent of cash and the range of 
defences available on a dishonoured bill is limited to total failure of 
consideration, quantified partial failure of consideration, illegality, invalidity and 
n7 at 162 
n7 at 162 
63 
64 
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fraud. 63 But as the High Court found 64, the traditional bill writ cases are not 
particularly relevant to the rights of a payee of a bank cheque. Essentially, 
this is because of the very nature of a bank cheque. A bank cheque is an 
instrument of the bank's not of one of the immediate parties. And the bank's 
customer is not a party to a bank cheque. Nor strictly is the payee. However, 
the Court of Appeal said it was important to note that there were in fact three 
separate contracts involved. 
The contract between Post Bank and Mr Deng 
The first contract was between Post Bank and Mr Deng. As between Post Bank 
and Mr Deng, Post Bank was not bound. Upon the dishonour of the Wah 
cheque, Mr Deng had insufficient funds to meet the bank cheque. Therefore 
there was a total failure of consideration as between Post Bank and Mr Deng. 
The Contract between Lam/Wong and Mr Yan 
The second contract was between Lam/ Wong and Mr Yan. Lam/ Wong gave the 
bank cheque to Mr Yan in return for $32,000. The Court of Appeal did not 
appear to question the bona fides of this contract. 
The Contract between Post Bank and Mr Yan 
The third contract was between Post Bank and Mr Yan. This contract was 
"constituted"65 by the bank cheque. The immediate parties to it were Post 
Bank as drawer and Mr Yan as payee. The Court found that, under s85 of the 
NZBEA, the contract came into existence on delivery of the cheque to Mr Yan. 
Mr Yan came into lawful possession of the cheque and gave good consideration 
for it to Lam/ Wong. 
International Ore & Fertilizer Corporation v East Coast Fertiliser Co Ltd 
[1987] I NZLR 9. 
n6 at 8. Presumably the Court of Appeal agreed not bothering to 
discuss the point further. 
n7 at 162 
66 
67 
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The concept of a contract between Post Bank and Mr Yan is interesting. 
Certainly it is difficult to analyse the relationship between Post Bank and Mr 
Yan in terms of off er and acceptance and intention to create legal relations. 
The reality of most transactions involving bank cheques is that the bank will 
have no knowledge of the identity of the payee66 and the payee may well have 
no knowledge of the identity of the remitter's bankers, at least until delivery 
of the cheque. In fact, typically, the only link between the bank and the 
payee, will be through the engagement of the bank cheque itself. 
An analysis of the relationship between Post Bank and Mr Yan in terms of 
contract has a further difficulty. In particular, whether Mr Yan's payment to 
Lam/ Wong was good consideration for the cheque as to the contract between 
Post Bank and Mr Yan? 
In this regard, the Court said:67 
"The learned authors of Byles on Bills (26th ed, 1988) at p224, say that 
between the immediate parties - that is, between the drawer and the 
acceptor, between the payee and drawer, between the payee and maker 
of a note, between the indorsee and indorser - the only consideration is 
that which moved from the plaintiff to the defendant, and the absence 
or failure of this is a good defence to the action. Here the 
consideration provided by Mr Yan as payee went not to the other party 
to the note, Post Bank, but to Lam/ Wong. At common law the essential 
requirement is that there is consideration moving from the plaintiff, not 
that the consideration is received by the defendant as the other 
contractual party. It must, however, be a consideration stipulated for by 
the defendant, so as to be given pursuant to the contract. In this case 
Post Bank had no knowledge of the transaction between Lam/ Wong and 
Mr Yan. It had authorised the delivery of the note to Mr Yan, thereb y 
making it complete, and by its actions it had enabled Lam/ Wong to 
Apart from the advice of the bank's customer. 
n7 at 162 
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obtain money from Mr Yan, but it had not authorised him to obtain that 
money as consideration for its promise to pay." 
Therefore, the Court found that, at common law, Mr Yan's payment of $32,0000 
to Lam/Wong was irrelevant to the contract between Post Bank and Mr Yan.
68 
At this stage, it appeared that an analysis of the relationship between Post 
Bank and Mr Yan in terms of contract was not going to assist Mr Yan. 
However, the Court then ref erred to s27(2) of the NZBEA which provides: 
"27(2) Where value has at anytime been given for a bill, the holder is 
deemed to be a holder for value as regards the acceptor and all parties 
to the bill who become parties prior to that time." 
By some unexplained leap in logic, it appears that the Court reasoned that, as 
Mr Yan had given $32,000 to Lam/Wong (i.e. value given at any time for a bill), 
by virtue of s27(2), Mr Yan had given good consideration in the contract 
between himself and Post Bank. In other words it appears that the Court used 
s27(2) as a kind of mechanism to get around the common law position against 
Mr Yan, i.e. that his payment to Lam/Wong was irrelevant consideration for the 
contract between him and Post Bank. 
The Court then went on to state:69 
"There were two separate contracts, as has been pointed out, one 
between Post Bank and its customer Mr Deng by which Mr Deng 
obtained merely the possession of the paper on which the as yet 
incomplete note was written, and a separate contract between Post Bank 
and the payee which arose on the note itself when it became complete 
on delivery. The first contract involved a total failure of consideration, 
but the second contract did not. Mr Yan gave consideration to a person 
lawfully in a position to deliver the note to the payee named in it. 
68 Ibid at 163 
69 Ibid at 164 
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We therefore do not think that the failure of consideration as between 
Mr Deng and Post Bank, or any rights of rescission of the contract 
between Mr Deng and Post Bank have any effect on the separate 
contract between Post Bank and Mr Yan constituted by the note and 
completed on delivery of it to Mr Yan." 
F. Application of Section 27(2) 
With respect, it is difficult to follow the Court's reasoning in respect to the 
application of s27(2). Section 27(2) essentially provides that where value has at 
anytime been given for a bill, the holder of the bill is deemed to be a holder 
for value. Its application can be shown by the following example. A draws a 
cheque in favour of B and gives it to B for value. B indorses the cheque to C 
for value and C indorses the cheque to D as a gift. The position can be shown 
thus: 
A -----> B -----> C -----> D 
value value gift 
As value has at any time been given for the cheque, D is a holder for value. 
Certainly, D is a holder for value as against A as clearly A signed the cheque 
prior to value having been given by C. D's right against B would depend on 
whether B indorsed the cheque prior to value having been given by C. D has 
no rights against C because clearly C did not become a party to the cheque 
until after value had been given by B. 
As the above example shows, the application of s27(2) is somewhat removed 
from the fact situation in Yan. A further difficulty is that, under the 
provisions of the NZBEA, little appears to follow from achieving the status of a 
holder for value. Only, under s28(2) of the NZBEA, is an "accommodation 
party", as defined by s28(1), liable to a holder for value. However, on the 
facts of Yan, the Court had little difficulty in finding that Post Bank was not 
an accommodation party, as defined .70 
70 Ibid 
71 
72 
73 
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Further, the Court found that a holder for value has no special statutory rights 
unless he or she is a holder in due course, which Mr Yan was not.71 This 
finding is probably wrong because it overlooks s28(2) that an accommodation 
party is liable on a bill to a holder in value as opposed to a holder in due 
course. In fact, the Court of Appeal appears to repeat its error at page 164 of 
the judgment where it states: 
" .. .in any event an accommodation party is only liable to a holder in due 
course." 
But s28(2) apart, if the Court of Appeal is correct that a holder for value has 
no special statutory rights unless he or she is a holder in due course, which Mr 
Yan wasn't, it is difficult to understand how s27(2) actually allowed the Court 
to get around the common law position against Mr Yan. 
The Court did, however, refer to the English case of Diamond v Graham,72 
which the Court of Appeal said considered the meaning of the corresponding 
s27(2) in the United Kingdom Bills of Exchange Act. In this case a man named 
Herman asked Diamond for a loan. Diamond agreed provided that Graham made 
out a cheque to him for the amount of the loan. Graham duly made out the 
cheque and handed it to Herman to give to Diamond. In turn Diamond gave his 
cheque to Herman. It transpired that Herman had previously given Graham a 
cheque for the loan amount which was dishonoured. In turn Graham's cheque 
was dishonoured and Diamond, having made the loan to Herman as agreed, sued 
Graham on the dishonoured cheque. Graham argued that no consideration had 
passed between him and Diamond. 
The English Court of Appeal rejected this argument finding that consideration 
had been furnished by Diamond by him releasing his cheque to Herman 
inferentially at the implied request of Graham. But the English Court of Appeal 
also referred to the English equivalent of s27(2) and said:73 
Ibid 
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"There is nothing in [s27(2)] which appears to require value to have 
been given by the holder as long as value has been given for the 
cheque, ... ". 
However, the reference to s27(2) in the decision of Diamond v Graham has been 
the subject of adverse comment. Robert Goff J. (as he was then, now Lord 
Goff of Chieveley) discussed Diamond in Hasan v Willson.74 The importance of 
Hasan v Willson is not the case itself, but Robert Goff J's discussion on the 
merits of the reference to s27(2) in Diamond v Graham. Robert Goff J said: 75 
"Although [Diamond v Graham) therefore arose between immediate parties 
to a cheque, nevertheless it was for some reason considered under s27(2) 
Robert Goff J then referred to the passage in Byles on Bills76 (referred to by 
the Court of Appeal in the Yan case) and after noting that the passage had 
appeared in every edition of the text since its inception in 1829 went on to 
state:77 
"However, in the 23rd edition (of Byles on Bills) for the first time some 
doubt is expressed about the accuracy of this passage. The learned 
editors state that in light of the judgment of Lord Justice Danckwerts in 
Diamond v Graham the passage must be treated with some reserve. The 
part of the judgment of Lord Justice Danckwerts which the editors had 
in mind occurs at page 1064 of the report, when he said that there was 
nothing in s27(2) which appears to require value to have been given by 
the holder as long as value has been given for the cheque. In my 
judgment, however, this statement does not constitute part of the ratio 
decidendi of the case which, as I have already indicated, appears to have 
(I 977) I Lloyds Rep 431 
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been that consideration for the cheque was furnished by the holder, i.e. 
the plaintiff, Mr Diamond, by his releasing his cheque to Mr Herman, 
inferentially at the implied request of the defendant. If Lord Justice 
Danckwerts is to be understood as having stated that, as between 
immediate parties to a bill, valid consideration may move otherwise than 
from the promisee, that I have to say, with the greatest respect, that I 
find it impossible to reconcile this statement with the analysis of the 
law by the Court of Appeal in Oliver v Davis.[78] In my judgment the 
passage I have quoted from Byles on Bills which has appeared in all 
editions of the work, is in accordance with basic principle and with 
authority, and accurately represents the law." 
The analysis of the law by the English Court of Appeal in Oliver v Davis 
ref erred to by Robert Goff J is summarised by Ellinger:79 
"The better view is that an antecedent debt or liability of a th ird party 
does not constitute value for the negotiation of a bill of exchange." 
There is some authority at odds with Oliver v Davis.80 But, in none of these 
cases was s27(2) or its equivalent directly relied upon. And, certainly the 
Court of Appeal in Yan made no reference to them. 
In summary then, Diamond v Graham is questionable authority for the 
application of s27(2) in the way of the Court of Appeal in Yan used it. Lord 
Justice Danckwerts ref ercnce to s27(2) may in fact be only obiter and has been 
doubted by one of England's most distinguished judges. It is interesting that 
the Court of Appeal did ref er to Hasan v Willson in its judgment81, but appears 
to have overlooked Robert Goff J's reservations about Diamond v Graham. 
[1949] 2 KB 727, [1949] 2 All ER 352 
E P Ellinger Modern Banking Law Clarendon Press 1987 Oxford at 508 
le Bonior v Siery Ltd [l 986] NZLR 254, Walsh and Ors v Hoag & Bosch 
Pty Ltd [1977] YR 178, Wragge v Sims, Cooper & Co (Australia) Pty Ltd 
(I 933) 50 CLR 483. 
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With respect, it is suggested that s27(2) was simply not available to the Court 
of Appeal to be used in the manner it was. And, it is not helpful to analyse 
the relationship between the drawer and the payee of a bank cheque in terms 
of contract. The Court of Appeal's approach to s27(2) is an enigma. On the 
one hand, the Court found that it could use s27(2) as a mechanism to get 
around the common law position that Mr Yan's payment of $32,000.00 to 
Lam/Wong was not good consideration for the contract between Mr Yan and 
Post Bank. Yet, on the other hand, the Court of Appeal found that Mr Yan as 
a holder for value had no statutory rights under the NZBEA. It is suggested 
that the two findings are both wrong and irreconcilable. 
The Court finally concluded:82 
"Matters such as total failure of consideration which will entitle a bank 
to dishonour a bank cheque as between itself and its customer will not 
avail the bank when its cheque is made out to a named payee, and the 
bank entrusts the cheque to its customer so that he can deliver it to 
that payee, and the payee takes it in good faith and gives value for it." 
It is interesting that, in the final event, the Court should refer to the payee 
taking the bank cheque in good faith and giving value for it. Of course they 
arc the essential ingredients in the definition of a holder in due course. 
G. An Equivalent to Cash? 
82 
83 
The Court of Appeal's task in deciding Yan was not made easier by its finding 
that there was an absence of direct authority on the point in any of the New 
Zealand, English or Australian cases. Indeed, the Court expressed surprise at 
this.83 Accordingly, the Court looked at the position in Canada and the United 
States. Following what is a somewhat cursory discussion of Canadian and 
Ibid at 166 
Ibid at 165. But see p.38 of this paper 
84 
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American authorities, the Court appears to have been reinforced in its decision 
that the certainty of payment of bank cheques is paramount. 
concluded:84 
The Court 
"Post Bank must be taken to be aware of the fact that bank cheques are 
commonly relied upon in commercial transactions as being almost 
equivalent to cash, and that the purpose of obtaining a bank cheque 
rather than the customer proffering his own cheque, is to enable the 
payee to have the added assurance of payment. This would be futile if 
the bank's cheque were to be no better than the customer's cheque 
against which it was issued." 
and 
"The use of bank cheques payable to order is commonplace for the 
settlement of commercial and conveyancing transactions, and they are 
generally treated as equivalent to cash to the extent that the only risk 
is that of the solvency of the bank. It is clear that they are not the 
same as cash, but if they are at the risk of dishonour because of a 
failure of consideration as between the bank and its customer, the trust 
which the market places on them would be misplaced and their 
usefulness substantially diminished." 
It is understood that Mr Yan produced no evidence before the Court of Appeal 
as to the common usage of bank cheques in New Zealand. Accordingly, the 
Court's findings were based on the Court's own knowledge and experience. But 
that the Court's decision was what the business community wanted is in no 
doubt. 
On behalf of the business community, the National Business Review reported on 
10 September 1993:85 
Ibid at 164, 165 
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"The Court of Appeal's reputation for radicalism has been tempered in 
the past month by two sound judgments on banking law [one of which 
was Yan] ... " 
On behalf of the legal profession, John Greenwood, the convener of the New 
Zealand Law Society Property Law and General Practice Committee, wrote:86 
"The Court of Appeal in the Yan case was given credence and legal 
substance to the convention, in the absence of any clear statutory rule 
or bank code of practice rule, and is to be congratulated for its common 
sense approach in its judgment delivered by Justice McKay." 
And a leading Australian academic commentator on banking law, Robin Edwards, 
in "New Zealand Lesson on Bank Cheques: Ricky Yan v Post Office Bank Ltd, 
1/9/93",87 in the context of New Zealand teaching Australia a lesson on bank 
cheques, ref erred to the Court's "refreshing vigour"88 and "robust approach."89 
And, the Court of Appeal itself has already affirmed the standing of the Yan 
decision in Williams v Gibbons.90 In this case a vendor's solicitor had refused 
to accept a bank cheque offered in settlement of the sale and purchase of a 
farm property. One of the issues on appeal was whether a bank cheque is good 
tender in settlement and whether the refusal to accept the cheque amounted to 
a breach of the agreement by the vendor. The Court found:91 
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Ibid at 41 
Ibid 
[1994] I NZLR 273 
Ibid at 277 
92 
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" ... that in contracts for the sale of land there is an implied term that 
tender of a bank cheque in settlement shall be good tender of the 
amount expressed thereon." 
Accordingly, the tender of the bank cheque was wrongly refused and the vendor 
was not entitled to cancel the contract. As to the standing of the Yan 
decision, Casey J said:92 
"It can now be confidently accepted following the recent judgment of 
this Court in Yan v Post Office Bank Ltd [1994] I NZLR 154 that the 
only risk entailed in taking a bank cheque is that of the issuing bank's 
solvency. That can be discarded as a realistic possibility." 
With respect, this is an exaggeration. It is to overlook: 
(i) where the bank cheque is forged or counterfeit; or 
(ii) where the bank cheque has been materially altered; or 
(iii) where the bank cheque has been reported lost or stolen; or 
(iv) if there is a Court order restraining payment; or 
(v) where there has been a failure of consideration for the issue of the 
bank cheque and: 
(vi) 
(a) the holder of the cheque is the bank's customer; or 
(b) the holder has given no value for the cheque; or 
(c) the holder has given value for the cheque but had, at the time of 
giving value, knowledge of the failure of consideration; or 
fraud. 
Ibid at 276 
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It is suggested that all the above can still be considered risks entailed in 
taking a bank cheque. 
H. Conclusion 
There can be little argument that the Court of Appeal's decision on the facts 
of Yan was the right one.93 However, this paper has attempted to show that 
the Court's decision is in fact not really supported by the provisions of the 
NZBEA nor is it supported by the common law. It is argued that the bulk of 
the Court's reasoning is redundant. In reality, the Court was concerned as to 
the practical consequences of the High Court's decision. The business 
community's faith in bank cheques, as a guarantee of payment, shaken by the 
High Court decision, needed to be restored. The Court of Appeal's decision , 
was to recognise the bank cheque's unique status, as a banking instrument that 
is the equivalent, or perhaps it is better to state the next to equivalent, to 
cash. This status does not originate from the NZBEA or indeed any statutory 
regime. It is a status that has developed through custom and banking practice. 
The Courts, particularly in the United States of America, have come to 
recognise this status and gradually it has become part of the law of bank 
cheques. The Yan decision is then really only the first opportunity for the 
New Zealand courts to recognise, what has already been recognised in other 
jurisdictions for some time. 
IV. OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
A. Australia 
93 
As explained earlier, the term "bank cheque" is peculiar to Australia and New 
Zealand. However, the Australian bank cheque is different to New Zealand's 
for three essential reasons. 
In so far as the admissable evidence showed and as long as one ignores 
Post Bank's and the High Court's reservations about Mr Yan's bona fides 
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First, bank cheques have express statutory recognition in Australia. Second, 
traditionally bank cheques issued in Australia are payable to bearer. Third, 
following the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in 
Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia v Sidney Raper Pty Ltd,94 the 
Australian Bankers' Association published a number of assurances regarding the 
dishonouring of bank cheques. 
l. Statutory Recognition/Payable to Bearer 
94 
95 
96 
Section 7 3( c )(ii) of the Common wea Ith Electoral Act 1918 requires candidates for 
election to the Australian House of Representatives to make a deposit of $100. 
The deposit may be paid by legal tender or by a "banker's cheque". The 
meaning of "banker's cheque" was considered by the Australian High Court in 
Fabre v Ley.95 
Shortly before nominations closed for the 1972 Australian elections, Fabre 
submitted a nomination paper nominating himself as a candidate along with his 
own personal cheque in the sum of $100. The Returning Officer refused to 
accept the nomination on the ground that Fabre's cheque was not a "banker's 
cheque" as required by s73(c)(ii). Fabre argued that the term "banker's cheque" 
as used in the Act could equally mean a cheque drawn by a banker (i.e. a bank 
cheque) or a cheque drawn on a banker (i.e. a personal cheque). Fabre further 
argued that the term "banker's cheque" did not mean the same thing as the 
term "bank cheque" which the Court found to be a term commonly used in 
banking practice in Australia. 
The Court rejected Fabre's arguments. While conceding that the term "banker's 
cheque" may be somewhat wider in meaning than "bank cheque", in that it may 
include a cheque drawn by a bank upon another bank, the Court found that it 
was clear that both expressions "banker's cheque" and "bank cheque" refer only 
to a "cheque" which is drawn by a bank.96 
(I 975) 2 NSWLR 227 
(1972) 127 CLR 665 
Ibidat671 
97 
98 
99 
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Of wider significance, since 1 July 1987, cheques in Australia have been 
regulated by the Australian Cheques and Payment Orders Act 1986 (Cth) 
("CPOA"). Section 5(1) of the CPOA expressly recognises bank cheques by 
providing that, unless a contrary intention appears, with exceptions, a reference 
in the CPOA to a cheque includes a reference to a bank cheque. Section 5(2) 
further provides that, with exceptions, nothing in the CPOA shall be taken to 
affect any liability that a bank would have in relation to a bank cheque. 
However the reality is that the CPOA provides very little assistance in 
establishing the rights of the various parties to a bank cheque as will be 
shown. 
Let us consider the facts of the Yan case and how that case would be decided 
in Australia under the CPOA. In Australia bank cheques are traditionally issued 
payable to bearer.97 This is of significance because a bank cheque payable to 
bearer is negotiated by delivery alone.98 Accordingly, if Lam/ Wong had 
delivered to Mr Yan an Australian bank cheque, the cheque would have been 
negotiated. This position is the same under both New Zealand and Australian 
law. As was explained earlier, it is because a bank cheque payable to bearer is 
negotiated by delivery when it is transferred from one person to another in 
such a manner as to constitute the transferee the holder of the cheque.99 
"Holder"100 includes the "bearer" of a bank cheque and "bearer"101 means the 
person in possession of a bank cheque payable to bearer. 
Under New Zealand law, Mr Yan would have qualified as a holder in due course 
if the bank cheque in question had been payable to bearer. However, in 
Australia, somewhat surprisingly, under the CPOA, the position is further 
n8 at 189 and n46 at 174, 183. Although the bank cheque in Union 
Bank of Australia Ltd v McClintock [1992] 1 AC 240 was payable to 
order. 
100 
s40(3) COPA/ s31(2) NZBEA 
s40(1) CPOA/ s31(1) NZBEA 
s3 CPOA/ s2 NZBEA 
101 s3 CPOA/ s2 NZBEA 
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complicated. Section 50(l)(a)(iii) of the CPOA contains an additional 
requirement to qualify as a holder in due course. In particular, that the cheque 
must not bear a crossing of the kind referred to in paragraph 53(l)(b) of the 
CPOA. 
Paragraph 53(l)(b) provides: 
"Where a cheque clearly bears across the front of the cheque the 
addition of 2 parallel transverse lines with the words "not negotiable" 
between, or substantially between, the lines, the addition is a crossing 
of the cheque, and the cheque is a crossed cheque." 
As bank cheques in Australia (as in New Zealand) are universally crossed and 
marked "not negotiable" Mr Yan could not therefore qualify as a holder in due 
course as defined by the CPOA. Indeed, there is even a further impediment. 
Section 49(2)(a) of the CPOA provides that a holder in due course "holds the 
cheque free from any defect in the title of prior indorsers ... ". But as already 
discussed, bearer cheques are negotiated by delivery alone. There is no 
requirement to indorse a bearer cheque. Obviously then s49(2)(a) is designed to 
apply to order cheques. When one couples this with paragraph 53(1 )(b) it 
appears that the rights of a holder in due course only apply to the holders of 
order cheques that are not crossed and marked "not negotiable". However, as 
far as bank cheques arc concerned, such a cheque does not exist as a matter of 
Australian banking practice. 
There appears to be no clear reason why bank cheques issued in Australia are 
payable to bearer. This is at odds with the practice in the other jurisdictions 
considered in this paper. Weerasooria 102 suggests it may amount to no more 
than an oversight and a failure to appreciate s44 of the Australian Reserve 
Bank Act.103 Whatever is the reason , it certainly produces odd results when 
coupled with the provisions of the CPOA. 
102 
103 
n7 at 189,190 
Which provides "A person shall not issue a bill or note for the payment 
of money pa yable to bearer on demand and intended for circulation". 
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2. Bankers' Association Assurances 
The decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in the Sidney Raper case104 
shook the Australian business community's faith in bank cheques. In this case, 
the bank's customer, a Mr Jacobsen, obtained a cashier's check drawn on an 
American bank and made payable to himself. Mr Jacobsen deposited the 
cashier's check into an account with the Commonwealth Trading Bank of 
Australia, and obtained from that bank a bank cheque payable to Sidney Raper 
or bearer. Sidney Raper was a real estate agent and Mr Jacobsen gave the 
bank cheque to Sidney Raper to hold in his trust account. In the meantime, 
the cashier's check was dishonoured following a tax lien being placed on the 
American bank by the United States Treasury. Accordingly, the Commonwealth 
bank dishonoured its own bank cheque on presentment by Sidney Raper. The 
New South Wales Court of Appeal were agreed that the bank could dishonour 
the bank cheque, but for differing reasons. Moffit P and Glass JA found that 
there was a total failure of consideration for the bank cheque and, therefore, 
the bank was not liable. However, Hutley JA did not find that there was a 
failure of consideration, but that the failure of the cashier's check enabled the 
bank to rescind the contract between it and Mr Jacobsen. 
In order to alleviate concerns about what now was the role of the Australian 
bank cheque, the Australian Bankers' Association published a number of 
assurances regarding the dishonouring of bank cheques. 106 The most relevant 
assurance for the purposes of this paper is in respect to failure of 
considera tion:106 
104 
106 
106 
n94 
Law Society Journal, July 1985 at 430 
Ibid. Other assurances related to forged, altered , stolen or lost bank 
cheques and Court orders restraining payment. 
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"Failure of consideration for the issue of a bank cheque; the issuing 
bank may dishonour the cheque only if either: 
the holder has not given value for the bank cheque; or 
if the holder has given value, the holder had, at the time of 
giving value, knowledge of the failure of consideration for the 
issue of the bank cheque." 
What legal status the Australian Bankers' Association's assurances have is 
argua ble.107 And, apparently, not all Australian banks belong to the 
Association.108 But on the face of the assurances, the holder of a bank 
cheque is given some comfort. However, it would still be open to a bank to 
argue that "value" must be given to the bank. 109 
In short, it seems unsatisfactory that a bona fides holder of a bank cheque 
should be limited in his or her remedy to an action under the Australian 
Banker's Assurances rather than under the CPOA which purports to provide a 
code in respect of cheques [including bank cheques] in Australia. 
3. An Equivalent to Cash? 
107 
108 
109 
110 
Surprisingly, the Court of Appeal in Yan did not refer to a considerable body 
of Australian authority to support the proposition that bank cheques are to be 
treated as the equivalent to cash. In Pere! v Australian Bank of Commerce 110, 
the bank had issued bank cheques in exchange for forged cheques of the 
trustees of the estate of a deceased person. In finding that the bank had 
been negligent in issuing the bank cheques to the fraudster in the way he 
In n87 Edwards suggests a cause of action under s52 of the Australian 
Trade Practices Act at 43 
n46atl85 
Along the lines of the reasoning of Robert Goff J in n74 
(1923) 24 S.R. (NSW) 62 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
39 
wanted them, Street C.J . of the Supreme Court of New South Wales 
observcd: 111 
"Bank cheques payable to bearer are to all intents and purposes 
equivalent to cash, ... " 
And, on the appeal of the same case, the Privy Council said: 112 
"A bank cheque so issued by a responsible bank is treated as equivalent 
to cash, and is used by the customer for any purpose for which cash or 
its equivalent is required, such as completing a purchase, paying taxes, 
etc." 
In Fabre v Ley 113 the Australian High Court had to consider the meaning of 
"banker's cheque" as found in s73(c)(ii) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act. 
The Court said:114 
"The plain intention of the Parliament in enacting s73(c)(ii) is that cash 
or its equivalent shall be deposited with the nomination paper." 
The underlining is the writer's. 
And in Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd v Mann 115 the Privy Council 
was told by counsel for the bank that the questions before the Court were:116 
" ... of such importance to bankers in Australia, where bank cheques are 
Ibid at 75 
(I 926) AC 737 at 740 
n95 
Ibid at 671 
n24 
Ibid at 4 
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treated as equivalent to cash, that the [bank], in the event of success, 
does not ask for costs in this appeal." 
As Weerasooria comments:117 
"Counsel's statement before the Privy Council was a clear admission that 
the Australian banks also [as well as the business community] regard 
their bank cheques as being equivalent to cash." 
B. Canada 
117 
118 
119 
120 
The Canadian equivalent of a bank cheque is called a bank draft. However, it 
should be noted that, in Canada, the term "bank draft" can include other forms 
of banker's instruments, for example, money orders. 
Insofar as they are bills of exchange, promissory notes or cheques, Canadian 
bank drafts are governed by the Canadian Bills of Exchange Act 118 ("CBEA"). 
Generally, the provisions of the CBEA are similar to those of the NZBEA. 
There is one essential difference, however. There is no Canadian equivalent to 
our Cheques Act 1960. Therefore, the provisions of the CBEA relating to 
crossed cheques 119 do not extend to the Canadian bank draft. This means 
that, on the facts of Yan, Post Bank's argument that Mr Yan did not have 
good title to the bank cheque would not have been available to it under 
Canadian law. Section 174 of the CBEA (the Canadian equivalent of s81 of the 
NZBEA) applies only to cheques and, similarly to the position in New Zealand, 
the Canadian bank draft is not a cheque.120 
n8atI85 
R.S.C. 1985, c.B-4 
ssI68-l 74 CBEA (ss76-8I NZBEA) 
Because: 
i) a cheque is a bill of exchange (sI65 CBEA); and 
ii) a bill of exchange must be addressed by one person to another 
(sl 7(1) CBEA); and 
iii) a bank draft is not addressed by one person to another. It is 
addressed by a bank to itself. 
121 
122 
123 
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In contrast to the United States, it appears that the Canadian bank draft has 
rarely troubled the Canadian courts nor has it excited academic comment. 
"Almost nothing has been written about these [bank drafts] in 
Canada." 121 
The best discussion of the Canadian bank draft is found in Crawford and 
Falconbridge's Banking and Bills of Exchange122 which the Court of Appeal 
well summarises in Yan: 123 
"The position in Canada is discussed in Crawford and Falconbridge's 
Banking and Bills of Exchange (8th ed, 1986) 1005, s3902, under the 
heading "Remittance Instruments" at pp 1006-1007, which they define as 
payment instruments purchased for the purpose of making a remittance. 
The holder's rights are stated as follows: 
"It seems that the payee of a remittance instrument has a 
stronger claim to be regarded as a holder in due course than has 
the payee of an instrument generally. This question of the 
status of the payee, so simple in principle, has become unduly 
complicated by authority. We review the problem in s5102.7. In 
simple terms, it means that so long as the payee gives value to 
the remitter, the instrument is enforceable by the payee against 
the issuing bank, whether or not the consideration given for it 
to the bank by the rcmitter wholly or partially fails." 
In s5102.7, the authors point out that the named payee in such an 
instrument, although appearing to be an immediate party, is not in fact 
linked to the drawer or maker by any contract other than the 
engagement of the bill itself. They argue that the payee should logically 
M H Ogilvie Canadian Banking Law, Carswell, 1991, Toronto at 676. 
(8th ed) Canada Law Book Inc, 1986, Toronto 
n7 at 165 
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be recognised as able to qualify for holder in due course status if he 
can achieve it, either by presumption or proof, notwithstanding the 
decision of the House of Lords in R E Jones Ltd v Waring & Gillow 
Ltd. 124 In their discussion of failure of consideration in s5302.9, they 
state the general rule as being that such defences are available only in 
an action between the immediate parties to the underlying transaction." 
The learned authors' argument is compelling, however, like Mr Yan, the payee 
of the Canadian bank draft is unlikely to qualify as a holder in due course. 
Like s29(l)(b) of the NZBEA, s55(l)(b) of the CBEA provides that a holder in 
due course is a person to whom a bank cheque is negotiated. The Canadian 
bank draft is universally issued payable to order.125 And, like s31(3) of the 
NZBEA, s59(3) of the CBEA provides that a bill payable to order is negotiated 
by the endorsement of the holder. Despite what the learned authors say, as in 
New Zealand under the NZBEA, the strength of the claim of the payee of a 
remittance instrument to be regarded as a holder in due course is not 
recognised by the CBEA. 
C. The United Kingdom 
In the UK the equivalent of a bank cheque is one of two types of "bankers 
drafts" or "bank drafts". In Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd v Mann 126 
the Privy Council observed that Australian bank cheques " ... are similar to 
"bank drafts" as known in the United Kingdom ... "127. Of the two types of 
bank draft, one is a draft drawn by one bank upon another. The second type 
is a draft where the same bank is both drawer and drawee. It is this second 
type of draft that resembles a bank cheque. 
124 See n35 
125 B. Geva "lrrevocability of Bank Drafts, Certified Cheques and Money 
Orders" (1986) 65 Canadian Bar Review 107 at 109. 
126 n24 
127 n25 
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As is the position in New Zealand, this second type of bank draft is not, by 
definition, a cheque nor is it a bill of exchange. 128 This is because it is not 
addressed by one person to another. It is addressed by a bank to itself. 
However, the holder of such a draft may treat the draft, at his or her option, 
either as a bill of exchange or a promissory note.129 
New Zealand's Bills of Exchange Act 1908 and Cheques Act 1960 were closely 
modelled on the English Bills of Exchange Act 1882 and Cheques Act 1957. In 
fact, many of the provisions are identical. There is one difference however. 
In New Zealand bank cheques are traditionally issued payable to order although 
there does not appear to be any statutory impediment as to why they could 
not be issued payable to bearer. But in the UK a bank draft must not be 
made payable to bearer. This is because sl 1 of the Bank Charter Act 1844 
makes it unlawful for any banker to draw, accept, make or issue, in England 
or Wales, any bill of exchange or promissory note, or engagement for the 
payment of money payable to bearer on demand. Accordingly, the English 
bank draft is issued payable to order. 
D. United States of America 
128 
129 
130 
131 
In the USA, bank cheques are called "cashier's cheques", or "cashier's 
checks" 130 the cashier of a bank being traditionally the chief executive officer 
of an American bank.131 Cashier's checks are regulated by Federal Reserve 
Board Regulation CC and by the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"). 
ss3 and 73 UK Bills of Exchange Act. The pos1t10n in New Zealand is 
exactly the same. Also Capital and Counties Bank Ltd v Gordon [1903] 
AC 240 at 25 l, 252. 
s5(2) UK Bills of Exchange Act. Again, the New Zealand statute is identical 
In the United States cashier's checks, teller's checks and certified 
checks are collectively known as bank checks. A teller's check, also 
known as a bank draft, is a check drawn by a bank upon another bank. 
A certified check is a customer's personal check that a bank has 
certified or accepted. A cashier's check, like the New Zealand bank 
cheque, is a check drawn by a bank on itself. 
Merchants' National Bank v State National Bank 10 Wall. 604, 19 L.Ed 
1008 (1913) 30 BLJ 594 cited in Banking Law Journal Digest (7th ed) 
(Vol. I) Warren , Gorham & Lamont, 1982, Boston at 138 
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I. Regulation CC 
132 
133 
134 
Barkley Clark explains the impact of Regulation CC as follows: 132 
"In times past, the law of bank deposits and collections could be derived 
primarily from Articles 3 and 4 [of the UCC] with Federal Reserve Board 
Regulation J taking a distant back seat. State law predominated in this 
area. As of September J, J 988, those times are history. On that date, 
Federal Reserve Board Regulation CC became effective, forever changing 
the legal landscape and imposing a new regime of federal regulation that 
overlays the UCC ... The lawyer advising a bank about a check 
collection problem must now focus on Regulation CC every bit as much 
as Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC." 
Regulation CC is intended primarily to cut down on "check holds" imposed by 
depositary banks 133. A "check hold" being when the depositor's account is 
frozen until the bank ensures that the deposited check has been honored. The 
term "cashier's check" is defined in Regulation CC 229.2(i) as a check that is: 
(i) drawn on a bank 
(ii) signed by a officer or employee of the bank on behalf of the bank as 
drawer 
(iii) a direct obligation of the bank 
(iv) provided to a customer of the bank or acquired from the bank for 
remittance purposes. 
Or to put it simply, a cashier's check is a check drawn by a bank on itself.134 
If a check qualifies as a cashier's check, and providing certain other 
conditions are met, it is eligible for "next day availability" under Regulation 
Barkley Clark The Law of Bank Deposits, Collections and Credit Cards 
(3rd Ed) (I 993 Cumulative Supplement No. 2) Warren Gorman Lamont 
1990 Boston at 6-4 
le collecting banks. Ibid at 6-5. 
Ibid at 6-47 
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CC 229.lO(c). Generally "next day availability" means that the depositary bank 
must make funds available not later than the business day after the banking 
day on which the cashier's check was deposited. This equates with the 
cashier's cheek's status as a "cash equivalent" since it is the direct obligation 
of a bank, not of the remitter. 135 
Accordingly, the provisions of Regulation CC increase the risks for the 
depositary bank by allowing the customer to withdraw deposits that have yet 
to be finally collected from the paying bank. Next day funds must be provided 
upon the deposit of a cashier's check. If the check turns out to be forged, 
then the depositary bank may well be left with only an empty cause of action 
against the forgerer. 
2. The Uniform Commercial Code 
The UCC has been described as "a comprehensive modernization of the law 
governing commercial transactions. It is designed to simplify and clarify the 
law, and to secure uniformity in the adopting states." 136 
Despite the purport of the UCC, prior to 1990, there was no express reference 
to cashier's checks in the UCC, except in Section 4-211(1) which included 
cashier's checks in a list of types of payment that a collecting bank may take 
in settlement. 
In December 1990, Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC were completely rewritten. 
Generally the purposes of the 1990 rewrite ("the Revision") were: 
(i) to clarify points of ambiguity 
(ii) to make the UCC dovetail better with implementing Regulation CC 
(iii) to companion a new Article 4A 
(iv) to create a legal framework more in tune with technological 
developments and modern banking and business practices. 137 
135 Ibid at 6-24 
136 Atlas Thrift Co v Horan 59 ALR 3ed 389 at 393 (1972) cited in Anderson 
Uniform Commercial Code 1 (3rd ed) at 3 
137 n 132 at S 15-2 
138 
139 
140 
141 
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Although there was argument138 that the UCC should include express 
provisions regulating cashier's checks the Revision did not attempt to do so. 
Instead it only provided a definition of a cashier's check as follows : 
"(f) "Check" means: 
(ii) a cashier's check ..... 
(g) "Cashier's check" means a draft with respect to which the drawer 
and drawee are the same bank or branches of the same bank." 139 
Strangely this definition is not the same as the definition of a cashier's check 
in Regulation CC. However, generally there does not appear to have been any 
attempt to standardise the definitions. 140 In any event, it would seem that 
the inclusion of a definition of cashier's check in the UCC will make little 
difference to the law on cashier's checks. 
"Much of the law of cashier's checks as it developed in the courts will 
continue to be recognised under revised Article 3, as that Article merely 
defines but does not make a complete regulation of all aspects of 
cashier's checks" 141 
Eg. L. Lawrence "Making Cashier's Checks and Other Bank Checks Cost 
Effective": A Plea for Revision of Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code 64 (1979-80) Minnesota L. Rev. at 275 
UCC Article 3-104 [ 1990 Revision] 
For example, the definitions of "check", "teller's check" and "traveler's 
check" are different as well 
Anderson Uniform Commercial Code 6 (3rd ed) Cumulative Supplement at 
272. The cases cited in this paper are classic cases decided prior to the 
Revision. Accordingly, the sections of the UCC referred to are prior to 
the Revision as well. 
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3. American Case Law 
142 
143 
144 
In contrast to the other jurisdictions, the American cashier's check has been 
subject to a bewildering amount of litigation. It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to summarise adequately all the cases but, in general terms, there have 
been two discerna ble approaches by the Courts to cashier's checks. 
(i) The Ordinary Negotiable Instrument Approach 
The first approach, adopted by the minority of the Courts,142 has been 
to treat cashier's checks as ordinary negotiable instruments and apply 
the provisions of the UCC. However, some of the Courts taking this 
approach have considered cashier's checks to be promissory notes, 143 
while other courts have considered them to be accepted drafts. 144 The 
difference has largely proved to be irrelevant 145because, in either 
event, the Courts have determined the liability of the bank in 
nl38 at 286 
Eg. TPO Inc. v FDIC 487 F.2d 131 (1973), Banco Ganadero y Agricola v 
Society Nat'! Bank 418 F. Supp 520 (1976), State Bank v American Nat'l 
Bank 266 N.W. 2d 496 (1978). These cases refer to section 3-l 18(a) of 
the UCC which provides that a draft drawn on a drawer is to be treated 
as a note. 
Eg. Swiss Credit Bank v Virginia Na t'l Bank 538 F.2d 587 (1976), Munson 
v American Nat'! Bank & Trust Co 484 F.2d 620 (I 973), Bank of Niles v 
American State Bank 303 N.E. 2d 186 (1973). These cases conclude that 
a cashier's check is "accepted" upon issuance and therefore any stop 
order is too late under Section 4-303 of the UCC which provides, in 
part: 
"Any knowledge, notice of stop-order received by, legal process 
served upon or setoff exercised by a payor bank, whether or not 
effective under other rules of law to terminate, suspend or 
modify the bank's right of duty to pay an item or to charge its 
customer's account for the item, comes too late to so terminate, 
suspend or modify such right or duty if the knowledge, notice, 
stop-order or legal process is received or served and a reasonable 
time for the bank to act thereon expires or the setoff is 
exercised after the bank has done any of the following: 
(a) accepted or certified the item .... " 
145 Because section 3-413(1) of the UCC provides that the contracts of 
acceptors of drafts and of makers of notes are identical. 
146 
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accordance with section 3-305 of the UCC relating to the rights of a 
holder in due course. 
Section 3-305 provides: 
"To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes 
the instrument free from -
(I) all claims to it on the part of any person; and 
(2) all defcnscs of any party to the instrument with whom the 
holder has not dealt except 
(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple 
contract; and 
(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the 
transaction, as renders the obligation of the party a nullity; and 
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign 
the instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity 
to obtain knowledge of its character or its essential terms; and 
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and 
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when 
he takes the instrument." 
For example, in Laurel Bank and Trust Company v City National Bank of 
Connecticut,146 a Mr Maisto had two accounts with Laurel Bank and one 
account with City Bank. Mr Maisto purchased a cashier's check from 
City Bank, paid for, in part, by a check drawn on one of his accounts 
with Laurel Bank. Prior to issuing the cashier's check, an officer of 
City Bank telephoned an officer of Laurel Bank and was assured that Mr 
Maisto's account had sufficient funds to meet the check. Mr Maisto 
deposited the cashier's check in the second of his accounts with Laurel 
Bank which substantially reduced an overdrawn balance. However, the 
first of Mr Maisto's accounts with Laurel Bank had insufficient funds to 
meet Mr Maisto's check and Laurel Bank dishonoured it. In turn, City 
365 A.2d 1222 (1976) 
147 
148 
149 
150 
151 
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Bank dishonoured the cashier's check and claimed the def ense of total 
failure of consideration. 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut determined that Laurel Bank as the 
transferee of a cashier's check was a holder in due course 147 and 
therefore City Bank was precluded under section 3-305(2) of the UCC 
from raising the defence of failure of consideration. 148 In dicta, the 
Court added that, under section 3-306(b) of the UCC149, City Bank could 
have raised the defense of failure of consideration against a party not 
having the rights of a holder in due course.150 
And, in State of Pennsylvania v Curtiss National Bank of Miami Springs, 
Florida, 151 a syndicate used a cashier's check issued by Curtiss Bank to 
purchase stock of a company. The syndicate discovered that part of the 
stock had been stolen and, on instructions from the syndicate's 
solicitors, the bank dishonoured the check. Before the United States 
Court of Appeal, the bank contended that the consideration given for 
the cashier's check included the stolen stock so that when the stolen 
nature of the stock was discovered, there was a failure of consideration 
for the cashier's check. 
Ibid at 1225 
Ibid at 1226 
Section 3-306(b) provides, in part: 
"Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person 
takes the instrument subject to 
(b) all defenses of any party which would be available in any 
action on simple contract; and 
Ibid at 1225 
427 F.2d 395(1970) 
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The Court found the bank's argument was completely misconceived. The 
cashier's check had been paid for by another check for the same amount 
which had been honoured. That check was good consideration for the 
cashier's check. The issue regarding the stolen stock was irrelevant. 
However, what is of importance is that, the Court said that had it not 
found good consideration for the cashier's check, it would have allowed 
the bank to raise the defense of failure of consideration against a party 
not having the rights of a holder in due course. 152 
(ii) The Cash-Equivalent Approach 
The second approach, adopted by the majority of the Courts, 153 has 
been to treat cashier's cheques as the equivalent of cash. The classic 
case most commonly cited as authority for this approach is National 
Newark & Essex Bank v Giordano. 154 The Superior Court of New Jersey 
said:155 
"A cashier's check circulates in the commercial world as the 
equivalent of cash. People accept a cashier's check as a 
substitute for cash because the bank stands behind it, rather 
than an individual. In effect, the bank becomes a guarantor of 
the value of the check and pledges its resources to the payment 
of the amount represented upon presentation. To allow the bank 
to stop payment on such an instrument would be inconsistent 
with the representation it makes in issuing the check. Such a 
rule would undermine the public confidence in the bank and its 
checks and thereby deprive the cashier's check of the essential 
incident which makes it useful. People would no longer be 
willing to accept it as a substitute for cash if they could not be 
sure that there would be no difficulty in converting it into cash." 
152 Ibid at 399 
153 n 138 at 289 
154 nl. The facts of this arc set out in p.52 of this paper. 
155 Ibid 
156 
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This is not to say that the Courts adopting the cash equivalence 
approach have ignored the provisions of the UCC. Most of these courts 
have adopted the position that cashier's checks are accepted drafts. 
But, in determining the liability of the banks, they have not looked to 
whether the holder of the check qualifies as a holder in due course. 
Instead, they have imposed on the banks an almost absolute obligation to 
honour a cashier's check. There is no express provision in the UCC to 
support this. Essentially, it is derived from the business community's 
perception as to what is the nature of a cashier's check. 
The cash equivalence approach may have received it's furtherest 
extension in Bank One, Merrillville, NA v Northern Trust Bank/Du 
Page.156 In this case, a check drawn on Bank One was given in 
exchange for a check drawn on Northern Trust. A bank officer of Bank 
One, knowing that the check drawn on Bank One would be dishonoured, 
decided to personally deliver the Northern Trust check to Northern 
Trust and obtained in exchange a Northern Trust cashier's check. When 
the cashier's check was presented, Northern Trust refused payment on 
the grounds that the Bank One check had been dishonoured. The 
Federal District Court in Illinois held that, despite the bank officer's 
fraud, a cashier's check is a cash equivalent and Northern Trust had to 
honour the check, then seek to recover the funds, just as would have 
been the position if cash had been used. 
It is suggested that the Bank One decision takes the cash equivalence 
approach too far. A better view is that the bank issuing the cashier's 
check should still be able to raise the defence of fraud on behalf of the 
holder. 
775 F. Supp 266 (1991) 
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V. OTHER TRANSACTIONS 
157 
158 
The fact situation in Yan raised the issue of whether a bank may raise 
defences of its own to the payment of a bank cheque. The Court of Appeal, 
in its search for authority on the point, referred to the position in the United 
States. In particular, the Court ref erred to the texts of two commentators157 
and the case of National Network & Essex Bank v Giordano. 158 However, the 
Giordano case and the two commentaries are not really authority for the issue 
at the heart of the Yan case. They were concerned with the much more 
common situation, at least in the American context, where the bank's 
customer, the remitter, has a claim or defence in respect of the transaction 
between the remittcr and the payee and requests the bank to stop payment of 
a cashier's check. The facts of the Giordano case provide a good example. 
Mr Giordano borrowed $9,500 from the bank to purchase two trucks from a Mr 
Fiero. The bank took a security over the trucks and issued to Mr Giordano a 
cashier's check payable to Mr Fiero. Mr Giordano delivered the check to Mr 
Fiero and took possession of the trucks. The following day Mr Giordano 
discovered the trucks were defective and requested the bank to stop payment 
of the cashier's check. The bank refused, claiming it could not stop payment 
of its own check. 
The Court agreed with the bank. Mr Giordano had no right to order the bank 
to stop payment on the check. Nor did the bank have any right not to 
honour the check. Mr Giordano's dispute with Mr Fiero was not assertable by 
the bank. 
In addition to the Giordano case, there is a considerable body of American 
le Michie on Banks and Banking 1992 Replacement Volume, The Michie 
Company, I 992, Charlottesville and SR Shapiro "Uniform Commercial 
Code": Bank's Right to Stop Payment on its Own Uncertified Check or 
Money Order" 97 ALR 3d 714 (1992 Supplement), see n7 at 165, 166 
nl 
159 
160 
161 
162 
163 
164 
165 
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case law 159 to support this conclusion although Barkley Clark 160 notes that 
the various Courts have taken "slightly different paths" 161 to it and "litigation 
continues apace on this issue." 162 But the point is that these cases are not 
really analogous to the Yan case. The Court of Appeal appears to have 
recognised this 163 but a more complete survey of the American authorities 
would have disclosed much more relevant authority. Perhaps the best example 
is Neve Welch Enterprises, Inc v United Bank. 164 In this case Neve Welch 
sold goods to a company named Tri-Power Electronics. In order to pay for 
the goods, the President of Tri-Power Electronics telephoned the defendant 
bank, and upon oral assurances that deposits would be made, the bank issued a 
cashier's check payable to Neve Welch. Tri-Power Electronics delivered the 
check to Neve Welch who immediately deposited it in its own account with 
another bank. But the promised deposits by Tri-Power Electronics were not 
made and the bank stopped payment on the check claiming failure of 
consideration. The Supreme Court of Utah found that Neve Welch had no 
knowledge of Tri-Power Electronics' failure to have sufficient funds to cover 
the check and took the check for value since it was obtained in payment of 
an antecedent debt. Although Neve Welch was the payee of the check, it 
qualified as a holder in due course165 and the Court was able to find in 
favour of Neve Welch as a matter of ordinary negotiable instruments law. 
Eg. Moon Over the Mountain Ltd v Marine Midland Bank 386 NYS 2d 
974 (1976), Dziurak v Chase Manhattan Bank, NA. 406 NYS 2d 30 (1978), 
Taboada v Bank of Babylon 408 NYS 2d 734 (1978) to name but a few. 
n 132. See nl43 and 144. 
Ibid at 2-112 
Ibid 
n7 at 165 
628 P2d 1295 (1981) 
Section 70A-3-302 Utah Code Ann. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
It will be recalled that Mr Yan could not qualify as a holder in due course 
under the provisions of the NZBEA. Accordingly, it was not available to the 
Court of Appeal to find in favour of Mr Yan as a matter of ordinary 
negotiable instruments law. The Court of Appeal purported to do so by its 
somewhat dubious application of s27(2) of the NZBEA but it is suggested that, 
in the final event, the Court decided the case using a cash equivalence 
approach. 
The difference between the Neve Welch case and the Yan case well illustrates 
the need in New Zealand for a more satisfactory legal framework to regulate 
bank cheques. As has been suggested earlier in this paper, there is simply no 
logic to the payee of an instrument payable to order not being able to qualify 
as a holder in due course. The unworthiness of the position is shown by the 
fact that Mr Yan would have so qualified if the cheque had been payable to 
bearer or alternatively indorsed to him. Therefore, to achieve the right result, 
the Court of Appeal had to resort to the somewhat nebulous concept of cash 
equivalence. 
The provisions of the NZBEA, based on the United Kingdom's Bills of Exchange 
Act 1882, are now over 100 years old. As a code of the law relating to 
negotiable instruments, the NZBEA has served well. But most of the NZBEA's 
provisions are inappropriate to regulate the relatively simple but somewhat 
different banking instrument that is the bank cheque. 
In August 1993 the Reserve Bank circulated a discussion paper mooting a 
review of the law relating to cheques. Among the proposals discussed was the 
separation of the law of cheques from the Bills of Exchange Act, along the 
lines of the Australian CPOA. Also discussed is the creation, by statute, of a 
simple non-transferable cheque, similar to that created by the UK Cheques 
Amendment Act I 992. While the bank cheque is not a cheque the writer 
suggests that the bank cheque too should receive statutory recognition and be 
included in any such new Act. 
55 
Any new legal framework to regulate bank cheques will need to recognise the 
bank cheque's peculiar status as a cash equivalent. What cash equivalence 
really means will need to be carefully defined. Certainly, it is not suggested 
that "cash equivalence" should impose an absolute obligation on the banks. 
That may be to make bank cheques better than cash. But the exceptions 
suggested earlier166 need to be made clear and available. Only then will the 
bank cheque achieve with the appropriate certainty its unique status as a 
guarantee of payment. 
166 See text accompanying n92 
BIBLTOGRA PHY 
R A Anderson Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code (3rd ed) The Lawyers Co-
operative Publishing Co, 1984, New York. 
H J Bailey The Law of Bank Checks (3rd ed) The Banking Law Journal, 1962, Boston 
(and 1969 supplement). 
Banking Law Journal Digest (7th ed) Warren Goreham & Lamont 1982 Boston (and 1990 
Cumulative Supplement) 
Barkley Clark The Law of Bank Deposits, Collections and Credit Cards (3rd ed) Warren 
Goreham & Lamont, 1990, Boston (and 1993 Cumulative Supplement No. 2) 
IF G Baxter The Law of Banking (3rd ed) The Carswell Company Ltd, 1981, Toronto. 
G Burton Australian Financial Transactions Law Butterworths, 1991, Sydney. 
Chorley & Smart Leading Cases in the Law of Banking (6th ed) by P E Smart Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1990, London. 
B Crawford & J D Falconbridge Crawford and Falconbridge Banking and Bills of 
Exchange (8th ed) Canada Law Book Inc, 1986, Toronto. 
P De Silva "Bank Cheques - Do they Guarantee Payment?" (1993) NZLJ 236. 
P De Silva "The Bank Cheque Resurrected" (1994) NZLJ 84. 
R Edwards "The Form of Bank Cheques" (1991) 3 Bond L Rev 174 
R Edwards "Section 37 Cheques and Payment Orders Act 1986 (Cth) and the Royal 
Runaround" (1993) 4 JBFLP 108 
E.P. Ellinger Modern Banking Law Oxford University Press, 1987, Oxford. 
57 
D Everett & S McCraken Banking and Financial Institutions Law (3rd ed) The Law 
Book Company Ltd, 1992, Wamberal. 
D Everett & S Mccraken Banking and Financial Institutions Law (3rd ed) The Law 
Book Company Ltd, 1992, Wamberal. 
J H Farrar & A Borrowdale Butterworths Commercial Law in New Zealand (2nd ed) 
Butterworths, 1992, Wellington. 
B Geva "Irrevocability of Bank Drafts, Certified Cheques and Money Orders" (1986) 65 
Canadian Bar Review 107. 
R M Goode Payment Obligations in Commercial and Financial Transactions Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1983, London. 
MB Hapwood Paget's Law of Banking (10th ed) Butterworths, 1989, London. 
V Ingram & I Govey "Twenty-two years on - A new Cheques and Payment Orders Act, 
Australian Law News, May 1987, 11. 
L Lawrence "Making Cashier's Checks and Other Bank Checks Cost Effective: A Plea 
for Revision of Articles 3 and 4 of the Unif arm Commercial Code" 64 (1979-80) 
Minnesota Law Review 275. 
R Makim "The Australian Bank Cheque - Some Further Legal Aspects" Monash 
University Law Review, Val 3 - November 1976, 66. 
J Milnes Holden The Law and Practice of Banking (4th ed) Pitman Publishing Ltd, 1986, 
London. 
Michie on Banks and Banking 1992 Replacement Volume, The Michie Company, 1992, 
Charlottesville. 
A McBeth "Mr Yan and Post Office Bank - Some Reassurance for Practitioners, Law 
Talk, October 1993, 402, 42. 
58 
Note, "Blocking Payment on a Certified, Cashier's, or Bank Check", (1974) 73 Mich. 
L.Rev. 424. 
M H Ogilvie Canadian Banking Law Carswell, 1991, Toronto. 
T G Reeday The Law Relating to Banking (5th ed) Butterworths 1985, London 
M W Russell Introduction to New Zealand Banking Law (2nd ed) The Law Book 
Company Ltd, 1991, North Ryde 
F Ryder & A. Bueno Byles on Bills of Exchange (26th ed) Sweet & Maxwell, 1988, 
London. 
S.R . Shapiro "Uniform Commercial Code: Bank's Right to Stop Payment on its Own 
Uncertified Check or Money Order" 97 ALR 3d 714 (1992 supplement) 
P M Shu pack "Cashier's Checks, Certified Checks, and True Cash Equivalence" (I 985) 6 
Cardozo L. Rev. 467. 
AL Tyree New Zealand Banking Law Butterworths, 1987, Wellington. 
AL Tyree Australian Law of Cheques and Payment Orders Butterworths, 1988, Sydney 
Weaver Craigie Banker and Customer in Australia (2nd ed) The Law Book Company Ltd , 
1990, Sydney. 
W S Weerasooria Banking Law and the Financial System in Australia (2nd ed) 
Butterworths, 1988, Sydney 
W S Weerasooria "The Australia Bank Cheque - Some Legal Aspects" Monash University 
Law Review, Vol 2 - May 1976, 180. 
J S Ziegel & B Geva Commercial and Consumer Transactions Cases, Text and Materials 
Emond-Montgomery Ltd, 1981, Toronto. 
VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY 
OF 
A Fine According to Library WELLINGTON 
Regulations is charged on 
Overdue Books LIBRARY 
1lll1i f ~"1i!OOW1i1i~i1IMi11Wii1 
3 7212 00431692 1 
r 
Fold r 
Hi 
Mill. Ro 5 Graham 
B k cheque 

